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The knowledge and enforcement problems faced by governments in defining 
traditional ‘command and control’ regulation are well known. Significant legal 
scholarship offers alternative models of ‘smart,’ ‘responsive’ environmental 
regulation, emphasising the need for policy instrument mixes, including the vital role 
of voluntary, industry-led sustainability standards. Yet, as is being increasingly 
recognised, these contributions leave open the need for detailed, qualitative 
evaluation of instrument mixes as a complement to primarily quantitative cost-benefit 
analyses that predominate in regulatory impact assessments by governments. 
Addressing this need, this paper evaluates policy and standards for low and zero 
carbon homes in England during the Coalition government (2010-2015) when the 
ecological modernisation discourse of the previous New Labour government became 
subsumed by a deregulation agenda. Our study, incorporating 70 stakeholder 
interviews, suggests that, in supplier-driven markets such as housing in England, a 
‘smart’ mix of mandatory and voluntary standards requires a strong, central role for 
government in setting national, mandatory standards and supporting their delivery. 
There is an important potential supplementary role for voluntary tools and local 
authority discretion, though our study highlights problems that can arise when such 
different instruments promote diverging roadmaps towards a policy goal.
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21. Introduction
A central challenge for contemporary governance is developing policy strategies and 
regulatory tools that steer towards goals, such as a low carbon economy, while allowing 
industry sufficient flexibility to adapt to change (author, 2012). In western, industrialised 
countries, recent years have seen a shift from traditional ‘command and control’ regulations 
to increased use of new instrument types, including market-based and voluntary tools. 
These shifts reflect an ecological modernisation (EM) approach, in partly transferring 
steering capacity to non-state and private sector actors (Jordan et al., 2013) and 
emphasising potential innovations that improve both environmental and economic 
performance. Yet a contrasting, market liberal, deregulation agenda has also had significant 
influence. This paper addresses the identified need for detailed evaluation of policy 
instrument mixes (Enevoldsen, 2005; Jordan et al., 2013) to assess the competing claims of 
these prominent, competing ideologies. The focus is on policy and standards for low and 
zero carbon (LZC) homes in England, where ambitious targets set by Labour were a key 
example of the influence of EM discourses (Lemprière, 2016). Our study focuses on this 
agenda under the Conservative-led coalition government 2010-15 where discourses of 
deregulation became prominent. 
Section 2 introduces our theoretical framework, drawing from literature on the politics, design 
and evaluation of environmental regulation, particularly EM and the notion of ‘smart 
regulation’ (Gunningham et al., 1998).  Sections 3a and 3b introduce the LZC homes policy 
agenda under New Labour and the Conservative-led Coalition government respectively. 
Section 3c discusses previous academic studies, highlighting the need for evaluative 
research on LZC homes policy strategy, with a particular absence of research on Coalition 
policy. Section 4 presents our methods and key findings. Section 5 discusses the 
implications of our findings, while Section 6 concludes. 
32. Evaluating regulation
2a. Ideologies and the politics of regulation
The ‘new right,’ market liberal deregulation agenda, which views regulation as a cost, or 
‘burden,’ that hampers economic competitiveness, has been influential in the UK since the 
1980s. The deregulation discourse became especially prominent under the Conservative-led 
Coalition government who introduced the ‘One In, Two Out’ rule and the ‘Red Tape 
Challenge’ that aimed to reduce the costs of regulation. Previously, New Labour’s proposed 
‘Third Way’ involved a more substantial role for states in shaping markets and promoting 
public goods provision than is countenanced by the new right. The international ‘Better 
Regulation’ agenda, concerned with improving the quality of regulatory instruments and 
processes, was influential in the late 1990s (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2009). However, the 
emphasis was that much regulation represented a burden in need of reduction (Tombs, 
2016) and the move towards a ‘risk-based’ regulatory model after the 2005 Hampton Review 
(2006)1 represented a significant shift in emphasis towards a de-regulation approach 
(Dodds, 2006). This involved a targeted approach to enforcement, based on careful 
calculation of the risks entailed by non-compliance. 
The deregulation discourse has origins in the public choice and Austrian schools of political 
economy, which offer somewhat contrasting reasons for scepticism towards regulation 
(Parker, 2002). Public choice theory emphasises the danger of regulatory processes being 
‘captured’ by specific interest groups. The Austrian school, particularly Friedrich Hayek, 
stress the inevitably limited knowledge available to regulators (author, 2012). The 
indispensable functions of markets in transmitting knowledge and promoting innovation, 
Hayek argues, will be impeded by even the most well intentioned governmental efforts to 
promote public policy goals through regulatory interventions. Yet the assumption 
underpinning new right arguments that regulation is a cost to business has been subject to 
1 Christopher Hampton was commissioned by the British government to conduct a review regulatory 
systems.
4recent challenge, notably in the literature on environmental regulation. Dieter Helm (2006) is 
critical of what he views as generalised claims about macro level costs of regulation that 
overlook the potential benefits of regulation in providing public goods, such as reducing 
pollution and promoting more equitable social outcomes. He argues that there is not 
necessarily a tight, negative causal relationship between regulation and economic efficiency. 
The de-regulation agenda, Helm contends, lacks an evidence base. He stresses the need 
for more detailed evaluation of the costs and benefits of specific policy instruments, given 
the significant variation in their susceptibility to problems of information and regulatory 
capture. 
Helm’s argument can potentially lend support to ‘ecological modernisation’ (EM), which 
involves use of a range of regulatory instruments for fostering ‘win-win’ environmental and 
economic outcomes. EM is sensitive to the epistemological challenges involved in selecting 
and defining instruments for addressing complex problems, emphasising the need for 
‘governance’ to draw from the expertise of state and non-state actors (author, 2015). 
However, some vested economic interests can be resistant to EM-inspired regulatory 
initiatives. This would seem to partly explain why, although EM discourses have had 
significant international influence, especially in Europe, this influence has been somewhat 
patchy (1998).
The term ‘ecological modernisation’ has been used to refer to a range of approaches to 
promoting ecological sustainability in the context of a thriving economy. Useful here is the 
distinction drawn by Christoff and Dryzek between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of EM. Weak 
EM, they suggest, focuses on environmental policy as promoting ‘win-win’ innovations that 
both improve environmental performance and foster economic competitiveness. The danger 
with weak EM, Christoff argues, is that it suggests a “technocratic” view of achieving change 
(Christoff, 2000). Strong EM is advocated as promoting a more holistic approach (Dryzek, 
1987) involving broader socio-cultural transformation of established production and 
consumption patterns, which are viewed as significant constraints upon the achievement of 
5ecological sustainability goals . Strong, as well as weak, versions of EM recognise the 
significance of regulatory instruments as potential drivers of ecological improvement. Indeed, 
the EM literature, with its challenge to the deregulation agenda of the new right, opens up 
the need for further evaluative research on regulatory policy, starting from recognition of the 
conflicting interests and epistemological challenges at stake (author, 2015).
2b. Evaluating instrument mixes and the challenge of complexity
The need for alternatives to traditional command and control is identified in the legal studies 
literature on regulation. However, rather than focusing on the challenges of instrument 
definition, the primary focus is on incentivising regulatory compliance. Proposed alternative 
compliance models start from the premise of the prohibitive costs involved in seeking to 
uniformly enforce mandatory regulations through a command and control approach. The 
‘responsive regulation’ model (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), which influenced the Hampton 
Review, proposes that non-punitive measures, such as persuasion and education, be used 
initially with action only being escalated up the pyramid to increasingly punitive measures for 
firms who are found to fail to behave as required. Proposals for ‘smart regulation’ 
(Gunningham et al., 1998) similarly advocate an escalator approach, including the use of 
voluntary tools as supplements to  mandatory regulations. In proposing ‘really responsive 
regulation’, Baldwin and Black (2008) seek to build on the above models whilst advocating 
greater sensitivity to the norms, understandings and institutional contexts that  shape the 
incentives and behaviour of individuals and firms being regulated. 
The epistemological challenges involved in instrument definition are recognised, at least 
implicitly, by smart regulation (Gunningham et al., 1998), which echoes EM in emphasising 
the need to draw from the knowledge and expertise of non-state and private sector actors 
(Gunningham et al., 1998). A prescriptive approach, involving industry adopting specific 
technological solutions, it is commented, requires regulators to acquire an especially large 
6body of knowledge about technologies which might be contested, uncertain and soon 
outdated (1998). Yet, epistemological challenges involved in instrument definition are not the 
subject of sustained focus in this literature. There is a need for closer consideration of 
approaches to this challenge, such as the ‘performance-based’ approach, articulated for UK 
building regulations, that defines a required outcome while allowing firms flexibility in how to 
achieve it, thus aiming to reduce vulnerability to negative unintended consequences2. While 
it may be possible to provide a measure of some sought outcomes, such as for some 
maximum pollution levels, this may, as discussed in our policy study below, involve 
balancing difficult trade-offs between multiple qualitatively distinct criteria. Hence, a 
performance-orientated approach can still be susceptible to epistemological challenges 
(author, 2012).
The possible complexities of defining sought outcomes is reflected in debates about policy 
evaluation methodologies. Widely used cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methods have been 
criticised for assuming that costs and benefits are monetarily measurable, given the 
complexities and uncertainties involved (O'Neill and Spash, 2000). While some regulatory 
impact assessments have sought to combine CBA with qualitative criteria to capture public 
or non-monetised goods, these have often been criticised for being “vague and 
indeterminate” (Helm, 2006). Applying CBA to regulatory evaluation also involves significant 
methodological difficulties. Notably, there is a danger of businesses over-stating the time 
and costs of reporting their activities to the regulators, given that they would need to 
undertake a significant proportion of these reporting tasks in any case, as part of routine 
management (Black, 2012). More extensive qualitative analysis of actual and prospective 
policy impacts can complement quantitative methods (Taylor et al., 2012) as a way of 
2 Jordan et al (2013), in placing all forms of state-defined, legally binding regulations in the single 
category of ‘command and control,’ overlook differences between prescriptive and performance-
orientated approaches. This distinction is important to consider in evaluating instrument selection. 
Jordan et al’s definition of command and control is valid and reflects their focus on distinguishing 
‘new’ policy instruments that are indicative of a shift to ‘governance’ in involving actors beyond the 
state, in contrast with government-defined regulations.
7achieving such a more balanced, nuanced view of regulatory benefits, costs and their inter-
relationships.
As Enevoldsen (2005) argues, the assumption of known, measurable costs and benefits 
becomes especially dangerous with the arrival of new forms of indirect regulation, such as 
market-based and voluntary tools, where, compared with traditional technologically 
prescriptive regulation, there is “even less reason to assume a one-to-one relation between 
policy outputs and outcomes.” The challenges of evaluating instrument mixes in the context 
of multiple institutions are especially profound. The effectiveness of policy mixes depends 
upon a range of factors, notably their parsimoniousness, as well as their complementarity 
both in terms of the standards they define (Gunningham et al., 1998) and their compliance 
processes (Baldwin and Black, 2008). Our study addresses this need for detailed, qualitative 
assessment of policy strategy and instrument mixes. 
3. The LZC homes agenda: from ‘ecological modernisation’ to the red tape 
challenge
3a. New Labour and LZC homes
In 2006, the Labour government set a target that from 2016 all new homes built would be 
zero carbon. It was forecast that around one third of homes standing in 2050 were still to 
built. Hence, policy for new homes was a significant part of the wider climate change 
mitigation challenge. In 2010, the agenda was reinforced when the EU Energy Performance 
of Buildings Directive (EPBD) targeted achieving ‘nearly zero’ energy buildings by 20213.  
The EM approach of this agenda, emphasising potential synergies between innovation and 
3 The EPBD requires member states to ensure that by 2019 all publically owned buildings be “nearly 
zero,” with all other new buildings having to meet this target by 2021. A nearly zero energy building 
(NZEB) is defined as having a “very high energy performance” and where “The nearly zero or very 
low amount of energy required” is “covered to a very significant extent by energy from renewable 
sources, including energy from renewable sources produced on-site or nearby” (European Union, 
2010). This general definition leaves EU member states room for their own specific interpretation and 
definition of an NZEB.
8housing sector competitiveness, has been highlighted by prior research (Gibbs and O’Neill, 
2015; Goodchild and Walshaw, 2011; Lemprière, 2016; Reid and Houston, 2013)4. 
Achieving emissions reductions in new homes without large scale public subsidy was seen 
as relatively feasible, compared with existing homes and other emissions sources such as 
transport (Williams, 2012). 
The 2016 target nonetheless involved significant challenges for the house building sector, as 
indicated by Osmani et al (2009) in one of the very few studies of this agenda with a policy 
evaluation focus. This study found the most significant barriers to be costs, housebuilders’ 
lack of trust in the required renewable energy technologies and housebuilders’ reluctance to 
change traditional practices. Prior studies suggest that house builders’ conservatism is a 
longstanding issue (Ball, 1999; Barlow, 1999). Combined with high research and 
development costs and a lack of consumer drivers for LZC homes (Osmani and O'Reilly, 
2009), this makes for a strong case for regulation as a driver of change (Sanstad and 
Howarth, 1994), as was widely accepted across the sector (Zero Carbon Hub, 2014). 
Typifying EM, the UK LZC homes policy agenda used a mix of policy instruments. However, 
state-led, national, mandatory Building Regulations (Part L for energy), were emphasised as 
having a central role, to avoid the cost of house builders having to adapt their practices to 
different regulations across different localities (DCLG, 2008b). The regulatory roadmap 
towards 2016 consisted of a series of Part L updates in 2010, 2013 and 2016, each requiring 
increased levels of building fabric energy efficiency (FEE). 
Government was explicitly committed to a performance-based regulatory approach, evident 
in the following statement:
“As well as being adaptable to changing circumstances, the policy needs to provide flexibility 
to meet known circumstances. Government’s preferred approach is, as far as possible, to 
specify outcomes rather than ways of achieving those outcomes and to avoid prescribing 
4 Barry et al (2004) discuss the centrality of EM discourses to New Labour environmental policy.
9particular technologies. This should help to drive innovation by house builders and their 
supply chain, allowing industry to use its expertise to explore how to minimise costs, and is 
consistent with better regulation principles” (DCLG, 2008a).
However, questions arose about how exactly to define the 2016 ‘zero carbon’ outcome. One 
question was whether, in a zero carbon home, energy consumed from ‘unregulated’ sources 
like cooking and plug-in appliances (i.e. those not covered by Building Regulations) must be 
from a renewable source. Initially, it was decided to include these ‘unregulated’ emissions in 
the zero carbon definition. A further, pivotal question was whether such renewable energy 
for zero carbon homes must be generated from renewable sources on the site of the home 
(e.g. solar PV, biomass). After widespread debate (author 2012) it was eventually agreed 
that the zero carbon definition would include a minimum emissions reduction level achieved 
through on-site measures, which became known as the ‘carbon compliance’ level. All energy 
consumed above this minimum carbon compliance level could be offset through a range of 
off-site measures, including off-site renewables, or ‘allowable solutions’. Government 
intended to confirm details of the carbon compliance standard and allowable solutions 
scheme before 2016, as part of the mandatory zero carbon target.
Table 1: zero carbon pyramid
Defining the sought performance outcome for LZC homes also involves complex trade-offs 
between energy performance and other environmental, social and economic criteria, such as 
water efficiency, health impacts and costs. Especially given this complexity, there is wide 
recognition in the UK construction industry of the important role for non-mandatory, industry-
defined standards, as highlighted by the ‘smart regulation’ approach. Such standards can 
potentially aid designers, fostering innovation beyond the regulatory minimum, responding to 
variation in regional markets and the business models and practices of different house 
builders. Notable examples include Buildings for Life and Secure by Design, covering areas 
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such as security and functionality, as well as sustainability and energy efficiency standards 
such as Passivhaus and AECB5 standards. 
Reflecting an EM approach to governance, New Labour sought to work in partnership with 
industry. To address the need for higher, non-mandatory LZC home standards, the 
Government commissioned the firm BRE6 to define and maintain the Code for Sustainable 
Homes. The Code defined six sustainability levels for new homes (Level 6 being the 
highest), based on a detailed methodology for assessing each home on nine sets of criteria 
(including energy/ CO2, water, materials and ecology). The Code became ‘quasi mandatory,’ 
being used to set mandatory national standards for social housing while also available as an 
option for local authorities and private developers setting standards for private market 
housing7. Some local authorities also established other kinds of policy. An influential initiative 
was the Merton rule, requiring that a percentage (usually 10%) of energy consumption be 
generated from on-site renewables in larger residential and commercial schemes. In 2008, 
as recommended by the Callcutt Review of Housing, the Government established Zero 
Carbon Hub, an independent organisation part-funded by industry, tasked with delivering the 
2016 target. The Hub drew together numerous stakeholders (Schweber et al., 2015) through 
a series of projects. Addressing sometimes conflicting stakeholder interests, they achieved 
wide support for their policy recommendations for the zero carbon definition. In 2009, 
Government adopted their proposed FEE standard, a key element of the definition. Yet a 
complete definition was not finalised by New Labour. The uncertainty this entailed had 
significant impact on the policy debate (Osmani and O'Reilly, 2009) and continued to be an 
issue during the Coalition. 
3b. The Coalition and deregulation
5 Published by the Association of Environmentally Conscious Builders.
6 Formerly the Government-run Building Research Establishment, now a private consultancy.
7 A recent report indicated that 48% of recent local plans had specific energy performance standards 
for buildings referring to the Code and/or BREEAM (TCPA, 2016).
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Under the Conservative-led Coalition government (2010-15), a stronger emphasis on de-
regulation subsumed the EM discourse evident in New Labour LZC homes policy. In 
response to uncertainty before the 2010 election, Shadow Housing Minister Grant Shapps 
had pledged to confirm the zero carbon definition “within weeks.” The Coalition maintained a 
formal commitment to the 2016 target throughout their term. However, a definition of the 
target was not forthcoming, with the government refraining from finalising the carbon 
compliance and allowable solutions elements. In the context of wide ranging public spending 
cuts, Government funding for the Zero Carbon Hub was withdrawn. The only key decision on 
the 2016 target was to remove unregulated emissions from the zero carbon definition. This 
brought the definition into line with the EPBD, with the effect of reducing the prospective 
scope of allowable solutions. There were delays to the 2013 Part L update, eventually 
introduced in April 2014, which set a lower minimum fabric efficiency standard than the two 
options presented in the Government’s consultation. These decisions were widely viewed as 
representing a ‘watering down’ of the zero carbon target8.
Yet, the Housing Standards Review, a key Coalition initiative following the Red Tape 
Challenge for the construction sector, had the arguably somewhat different aim of 
‘streamlining’ the numerous national and local standards for housing. Five key areas were 
addressed: energy, water, security, space and accessibility. The focus was on the number of 
standards and their inter-relationships, rather than on their specific level. For energy, the key 
recommendation was to wind down the Code. Government did not confirm they would act 
upon this recommendation until March 2015, causing significant uncertainty about the future 
of local planning requirements during the interim period. The Coalition’s National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF) introduced in 2012 with the aim of streamlining planning policy, 
focused on ensuring ‘viability,’ reflecting concern about the planning system being a barrier 
to development, including the time and costs associated with planning policies. This focus on 
viability has been widely viewed as a challenge to policies seeking to raise environmental 
8 This point is further discussed in Section 4c.
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standards, reflecting a debate about tensions between environmental policies and 
development that has been ongoing since the 1970s (Frieden, 1979). Shortly after the 
Conservatives won the 2015 election, they scrapped the 2016 zero carbon target. Also it 
was made significantly more challenging for local authorities to introduce Merton rule- type 
policies setting requirements for on-site renewables. The pending UK departure from the 
European Union will entail an end to the obligation for the UK to aspire to the EU nearly zero 
target and there may be no further upgrades to Part L as a substitute for this target in the 
coming years.
3c. Prior studies of the LZC homes agenda
Prior studies of the LZC homes agenda have applied contrasting disciplinary approaches, 
including sociological studies of the challenge of ‘mainstreaming’ niche eco-home 
developments (Smith, 2007), analyses of the framing of policy evidence (Schweber et al., 
2015) and of policy implementation (Goodchild and Walshaw, 2011). Through contrasting 
approaches, prior research offers important insights for evaluating this policy agenda. 
Lempriere (2016) highlights the inevitably politically contested character of EM policy 
strategy. This reflects Hajer’s more general point about EM that particular industry coalitions 
will vary in terms of gaining or losing from higher regulations (Hajer, 1993). After the launch 
of the agenda, developers often expressed concern about having to shoulder the cost of 
zero carbon homes, emphasising that investments in wider infrastructure such as 
‘decarbonising’ the electricity grid or public transport would yield higher marginal gains (HBF, 
2009). Yet, manufacturers of some construction products, such as insulation, along with 
housing developers specialising in the design of LZC homes, had vested interests as well as 
personal concern with progressing the LZC homes agenda (Lemprière, 2016). 
In relation to the complexities of defining policies and standards, several studies suggest that 
a shortcoming of the LZC homes policy agenda is its focus on technological solutions with a 
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lack of attention to the broader social context that shapes the full ecological impacts of 
homes and their use by occupants (Gibbs and O’Neill, 2015; Reid and Houston, 2013). This 
social dimension of innovation includes building practices and skills, occupant behaviour and 
lifestyles. This echoes strong EM critiques of weak EM, providing cause for questioning how 
far sustainability goals are achievable through top down policy delivery alone (see Section 
2a). Indeed New Labour environmental policy discourse in general has been described as 
reflecting ‘weak EM’ (Revell, 2005). 
Prior work in engineering and housing studies has provided significant evaluative insights 
concerning the zero carbon definition, highlighting what Schweber et al (2015) observe is the 
contested nature of the concept. Key criticisms have been that the Code focuses too 
strongly on on-site renewables (Lowe and Oreszczyn, 2008), neglecting the embodied and 
lifecycle CO2 footprint of these technologies (McLeod et al., 2012; McManus et al., 2010). 
With echoes of the enforcement challenges highlighted by ‘smart’ and ‘responsive’ regulation 
models, concerns about the levels of compliance with building regulations have also been 
raised (Fischer and Guy, 2009; Osmani and O'Reilly, 2009). Yet, as with the smart 
regulation literature generally, there is a lack of detailed evaluative studies of how, 
specifically, policies, standards and their inter-relationships are defined. Research on how 
this UK policy agenda evolved during the Coalition government is particularly lacking.
An international comparative study of policy for energy efficient buildings finds that a mix of 
mandatory regulations and voluntary tools, as advocated by the smart regulation model, are 
generally suitable for this sector (Shen et al., 2016). While mandatory regulations can 
potentially address market failures swiftly, they can suffer from poor responsiveness to 
change. Considerable resources are required to achieve a continuous, robust approach. 
Voluntary instruments can have an important role, by potentially offering flexibility and 
fostering public engagement with energy efficiency issues (Shen et al., 2016). Our study 
addresses this need to evaluate the definition and balance between mandatory and 
voluntary instruments. 
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4. Policy and standards for LZC homes under the Coalition government (2010-15): 
an evaluative study 
4a. Scope and methods
Our evaluation of LZC homes policy draws from qualitative analysis of the perspectives of 
various types of stakeholder, including designers (architects and engineers), planners, 
contractors and surveyors. Where a significant degree of common ground can be identified 
between stakeholders’ views about policy instruments’ effectiveness in promoting particular 
goals, this can provide grounds for evaluative conclusions and recommendations (author 
2012). We analyse the views of the following two stakeholder types: 
(i) National stakeholders involved in the national level debate about policy and 
standards9. 
(ii) Local stakeholders involved in the design and delivery of LZC homes locally, 
within three English cities: Brighton, Manchester and London Borough of 
Greenwich.
The three local authorities were selected because each stated strong commitment to 
delivering LZC homes and initiated a range of LZC home developments of varying sizes and 
home types10. Practitioners could therefore be expected to have significant experience of 
working to the higher sustainability standards we were evaluating.  This selection also 
captures potentially different experiences between London, the North and Southern 
England. Stakeholders for each category were chosen to ensure that that contrasting 
9 Note that some stakeholders in this category were themselves involved with the local delivery of 
projects. 
10 Our analysis of their strategy documents and previous planning applications for these local 
authorities confirmed that they included a balance of private and social housing developments and 
home types (houses and apartments).
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expertise and opinions of various stakeholder types were included11 (detailed breakdown 
shown in Appendix 1).
Our semi-structured interviews were based on questions standardised for our national and 
local interviewees. Questions concerned how stakeholders viewed the challenges of 
delivering LZC homes and the strengths and weaknesses of specific mandatory and non-
mandatory national and local policy instruments and their inter-relationships. These included 
Part L, zero carbon target, the Code and other voluntary tools and local policies of which 
interviewees had experience. Our focus is on energy standards, although we also consider 
sustainability issues more widely (notably in the Code) in so far as they inter-relate with 
energy. Our analysis of the interviews focuses upon identifying and comparing stakeholder 
views, including the extent of any common ground and identifying key cleavages in opinion. 
A supplementary review of policy documents and reports from Government and key 
stakeholders was undertaken. As explained below, we found a significant amount of 
agreement across the range of stakeholders on some key policy questions. Even where 
opinions were more divided, most notably on the withdrawal of the Code, the cleavage was 
not clearly aligned with particular types or backgrounds of stakeholder, though our analysis 
does indicate where possible the broad stakeholders categories expressing particular views.  
Presenting this analysis, Section 4b assesses challenges facing house builders in delivering 
LZC homes. Section 4c assesses Coalition policy strategy effectiveness in the face of these 
challenges. 
4b. Challenges for the LZC homes agenda 2014-15
In contrast with the early years of the LZC homes agenda12, costs were not the most 
frequently mentioned challenge of delivering LZC homes. The process of learning since the 
11 A set of housing developments in each of the three cities were selected and interviewees were 
contacted as practitioners involved with these projects. Further potential interviewees were then 
identified through a process of snowball sampling. 
12 See the discussion of research by Osmani et al (Osmani and O'Reilly, 2009) in Section 3a.
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agenda was introduced in 2006 is often the subject of comment. Reaching Code level 4 
through a high FEE standard without the need for renewables is now widely viewed as 
achievable13. Rather than costs, the main challenge is very widely viewed as addressing the 
‘performance gap’ between how buildings are designed and as built performance. There is 
concern about the related issue of potential overheating in buildings with high levels of air 
tightness, hence the need for careful attention to building ventilation and orientation, given 
the potential negative impacts upon human health. 
Stakeholders often suggest various ways in which government might more actively support 
industry towards achieving a transition to large-scale LZC homes delivery, addressing these 
problems of performance. Skills shortages across professions involved with housing are 
vitally important, from on-site construction workers, to architects and SAP assessors, to 
surveyors and valuers. Some of our local interviewees were especially pessimistic about the 
immediate prospects for addressing these skills challenges. A further factor concerns the 
performance of various LZC technologies, of which perceptions vary significantly. Some 
technologies such as solar PV are commonly viewed by designers and developers as having 
become established and more reliable since 2006, largely due to their widespread uptake in 
existing homes. However, local industry stakeholders expressed concern even about the 
performance and maintenance of PV. Other technologies are widely viewed as still 
emerging, with biomass and heat pumps often viewed as particularly problematic or 
uncertain14. With echoes of prior research highlighting the significance of the social 
dimension of technological innovation (see Section 3c), some of our local interviewees 
observed problems with incorrect use of technology by residents and those maintaining 
buildings, suggesting the need for a verification process, an improved handover process for 
residents and performance monitoring.
13 The AIMC4 project had a significant role in promoting the learning, through the development of 
robust technical and commercial solutions for large volume delivery.
14 This point is the subject of contrasting views. One interviewee commented on how early problems 
with air source heat pumps have now been largely addressed in more recent housing schemes.
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Experts and practitioners emphasised the investment in research and development needed 
to support assessment tools for LZC homes, most notably the Standard Assessment 
Procedure (SAP) tool used to assess Part L compliance. Designers suggest that SAP both 
incorporates and allows to be entered unrealistic and inaccurate parameter values, 
concerning features such as ventilation and thermal bridging15. Furthermore, the static model 
underlying SAP is not designed to account for dynamic factors, such as thermal mass, heat 
gains, airflow, orientation and climatic factors, which have significant impacts, especially 
where high performance standards are sought. Leading design experts comment that there 
is often a tendency for designers to focus on Part L compliance or Code requirements as 
measured by the SAP tool, while neglecting this wider range of complex factors. Hence, in 
practice, building performance might not meet the sought energy efficiency standard and 
potential health impacts relating to air quality and overheating might not be adequately 
foreseen. Accredited Construction Details (ACDs) are a potential aid for designers to 
improve fabric efficiency performance, the development of which government could 
potentially facilitate. Our local interviews suggest there has been very little take up so far of 
the ACDs recently developed16.
A further challenge lies on the demand side. Consumer drivers for LZC homes are widely 
viewed as lacking, given the priority of other key criteria for homebuyers (e.g. schools, local 
amenities etc.) The consensus amongst our interviewees was that the zero carbon target 
and the Code had a primarily technical focus of internal interest to industry, which largely 
failed to foster interest and understanding amongst homebuyers. Several commented that 
even where energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies bring financial benefits of 
lower fuel bills or Feed-in-Tariff revenues, these features only command a price premium in 
niche markets. Marginal energy efficiency gains from recent Part L updates are in any case 
15Several of our interviewees with design expertise expressed concern that some parameter values 
contained within the SAP, ranging from assumptions about climate to the assumed performance of 
specific technologies such as boilers and ventilation, are not sufficiently accurate.
16 ACDs have been developed by National House Building Council and Local Authority Building 
Control.
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of much less significance to consumers than the key decision of whether to purchase a new 
or old home, given the markedly higher energy consumption that older, un-refurbished 
homes entail. A further factor weakening consumer drivers for sustainable homes is the well-
known shortage of housing supply in much of England. Furthermore, the professional codes 
and associated training of surveyors and valuers do not require them to take into account 
energy efficiency savings when valuing new homes. Given the grounds for questioning 
whether cost savings can be sufficient as a driver, an alternative, or potentially 
supplementary approach emphasised by some experts is to communicate to consumers 
overall quality of life benefits, including comfort, air quality and the use of good quality 
materials. 
4c. Evaluating policy and standards for LZC homes 2014-15
Our findings provide significant support for Helm’s emphasis on potential benefits of re-
shaping markets through regulation. The Zero Carbon target and the Code are widely 
viewed by our participants as having promoted significant innovation and learning in 
construction. A very common theme stressed by interviewees was the importance of a clear, 
consistent national policy trajectory. Many of our national and local interviewees, including 
developers and designers, commented that uncertainty about future LZC homes policy 
hindered the development of working practices towards achieving higher FEE standards. 
Some national stakeholders also emphasised that this hindered developers in land price 
negotiations. 
There was wide support from stakeholders for the policy approach of successive 
governments, including the Coalition, of emphasising Part L as the single FEE standard that 
should be the primary, mandatory driver towards LZC homes. This support was not only 
from developers who emphasise the economies of scale this can bring for delivering new 
homes across the country. As further explained below, a broad range of other stakeholders 
support ‘fabric first’ as a general principle, emphasising the need to reduce the energy 
required to heat a building as a priority before on-site LZC technology installation is 
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considered. A range of designers, sustainability consultants and some local authorities 
themselves are, at best, ambivalent, if not deeply sceptical, about local authorities having 
discretion to set local energy targets, such as for on-site renewables. This emphasis on the 
need for strong national policy reflects agreement that, unlike some sustainability issues, 
notably water scarcity and biodiversity, it is broadly agreed that the need for energy 
efficiency does not vary significantly across the country. 
Reflecting general support for ‘fabric first’, there was broad agreement on the need to further 
strengthen the FEE standard within Part L. Several national stakeholders with design 
expertise, representing key parts of the housing and construction sector, expressed 
disappointment about the Part L 2013 update setting lower standards than suggested in the 
consultation. This was described candidly as “hopelessly unambitious”, a “fudge” and “much 
less rigorous than signalled”.  The Hub’s proposals for the FEE level within the 2016 target17 
had gained much support, albeit with some designers who favour a Passivhaus approach 
advocating a higher standard. However, aside from this question of the exact level at which 
the standard is defined, a primary concern for many, as discussed in Section 4b, is the need 
to support industry in delivering the mandatory standard. 
LZC homes policy reveals the need for close attention to the role and definitional 
characteristics of non-mandatory or discretionary standards that supplement national, 
mandatory regulations. We found further evidence, consistent with previous studies (see 
Section 3c), that a significant proportion of stakeholders have serious concerns about 
whether the Code effectively balances the various economic, environmental and social 
criteria requiring consideration. Yet, in principle, the need for a non-mandatory Code to 
supplement mandatory regulations as a driver of further innovation was widely accepted 
across the sector. Variation in housing markets, skill bases and supply chains, some 
emphasised, meant that there was an important potential role for local authorities, exercising 
discretion, to adopt standards above the national regulatory minimum. Consequently, the 
17 See Section 3a above.
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question of withdrawing the Code most divided opinion amongst our interviewees. This 
cleavage did not clearly align with their types of expertise or occupation. Various 
stakeholders emphasise that achieving Code certification involves significant administrative 
costs, although the Code provides a common industry language and audit process for 
addressing energy and sustainability that is widely viewed as having promoted learning and 
embedded change. Removal of the Code, some point out, can be justified as ‘streamlining,’ 
with energy and water efficiency building regulations having been strengthened.18 However, 
various experts expressed concern that, after the proposed withdrawal of the Code, policy 
will no longer cover other sustainability criteria, notably ecology and the sustainability of 
materials. 
Reflecting wide support for ‘fabric first,’ often supplemented by a preference, especially 
amongst developers, for funding off-site CO2 mitigation measures or ‘allowable solutions,’ 
stakeholders often challenge the Code approach of assigning points for installing on-site 
technologies and facilities within homes. The Code, particularly levels 5 and 6, they argue, 
encourages installations of facilities such as water recycling systems, cycle storage and 
home office space simply to ‘tick the box,’ without sufficient consideration of how 
technologies are used in practice, their costs, or even whether they are used at all. This 
point is emphasised not only by developers concerned about costs but also by designers 
and other industry experts strongly committed to high environmental standards. These 
criticisms often reflect more fundamental reservations that the LZC homes agenda was too 
focused on technology, with a need for a closer focus on the social dimension of technology 
installation and use, as critics of EM emphasise. Some stakeholders regret the absence of 
other social dimensions of sustainable development from the Code, such as public 
engagement, food growing, training, skills and apprenticeships, as well as criteria such as 
18 The FEES level proposed by the Hub, which is viewed as broadly similar to Code Level 4 for 
energy, was set to be incorporated in the 2016 zero carbon target. The water standard in building 
regulations of 125 litres/ person/ day is a stronger standard than that proposed by the Environment 
Agency (2009).r, 
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transport accessibility and local amenities which had been included in BRE’s previous 
Ecohomes standard19. Several interviewees, including developers and designers, expressed 
concern about the accountability of the process for maintaining the Code. Also in an 
interesting juxtaposition to the ‘smart regulation’ emphasis upon the flexibility and 
responsiveness of industry-defined voluntary tools, these stakeholders expressed regret at 
the lack of development of the Code. They queried whether BRE were using their revenues 
for this purpose, though this also reflected a lack of government funding.
The predominance of the Code amongst industry LZC home standards, due to its ‘quasi 
mandatory’ status, raises the question of which LZC home standards might replace it as a 
driver of higher standards beyond the regulatory minimum. The most widely recognised 
alternative is Passivhaus, based on a very highly regarded design approach and modelling 
tool PassiveHaus Planning Package (PHPP) for achieving comfortable, energy efficient 
homes. Yet, the suitability of Passivhaus as a mass-market housing standard is widely 
questioned.  PHPP is demanding in terms of the skills required and the Passivhaus standard 
does not incorporate other sustainability criteria. The BRE’s new standard, the Home Quality 
Mark (HQM), aims to foster consumer engagement through a focus on criteria such as 
health and well-being which LZC homes can potentially promote. However, restrictions on 
local authority powers to set standards as planning conditions and industry fatigue regarding 
codes and standards suggest that uptake of the HQM is likely to be very limited compared 
with the Code. As there is no one clear replacement for the Code, it seems that, somewhat 
paradoxically, the Housing Standards Review, with its goal of ‘streamlining,’ could  lead to a 
variety of different voluntary standards being adopted across the country. There is a danger 
that this could create more confusion and uncertainty for industry of the kind the Review 
aimed to prevent.
19 The Ecohomes tool was superseded by the Code as the BRE tool for assessing the sustainability of 
homes.
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Some interviewees suggested that local planning policies might cover the sustainability 
criteria previously only addressed by the Code. However, several industry stakeholders 
commented that local planning authorities lack the required expertise and resources to 
effectively deliver local LZC homes policies. Local authorities have frequently been criticised 
for setting high Code requirements or on-site renewables targets without having been in the 
position to assess fully their viability or feasibility20.  The need for local authorities to review 
their plans following the winding down of the Code and the requirement for viability testing 
entails additional costs that will further stretch their resources.21 Yet, local authority capacity 
and expertise, it is recognised, varies significantly. Some are pro-active, for example, 
Cambridge and Brighton have initiated their own sustainability checklists and tools. There 
remains significant scope for local authorities to support LZC housing developments even in 
the context of reduced discretion in the use of standards. They can have a key role in 
promoting infrastructure such as district heating networks, acting as client for housing 
projects on public land and promoting development of local construction skills22.  However, 
wide support for national policy consistency suggests that this potential role of local authority 
discretion in promoting innovation is, like that of voluntary standards, best viewed as a 
supplement to strong, mandatory national regulations.
20 For example, the Home Builders Federation (HBF) repeatedly lobbied Government to try and 
ensure that their members would not have to meet specific renewables targets. In their response to 
the Housing Standards Review the HBF argued that: “Any such local policies dilute and undermine 
successful achievement of the zero carbon policy and should not be allowed.”(Slaughter, 2013)
21 Local government officials interviewed commented on the additional costs and administrative 
burdens involved for local authorities reviewing their local planning policies. This is especially a 
concern for authorities promoting standards above Building Regulations. It is notable that the 
Government does not provide definitive guidance to support viability testing, though professional 
bodies including RICS and NHBC have developed approaches for local authorities to address 
viability. Hence, the Environmental Audit Committee commented: “DCLG's proposed needs test on 
the application of sustainability standards by local authorities risks becoming a lawyers' charter. It 
could curtail local choice, delay the construction of new homes, drive down standards of sustainability 
and compel local authorities to incur unnecessary legal fees” (H.M. Parliament, 2013).
22 For example, through the inclusion of apprenticeships as part of Section 102 agreements.
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5. Discussion
This study of the LZC homes policy agenda finds wide agreement concerning the need for 
strong national regulations as a core driver of higher standards and innovation, especially in 
markets with weak consumer drivers, such as the English housing market.23 Non-mandatory, 
industry-defined standards of the kind advocated by ‘smart regulation’ are widely viewed as 
having an important potential supplementary role in driving innovation and fostering 
consumer engagement, especially in those localities and markets most receptive to 
environmental sustainability concerns. Yet, there are mixed views about the effectiveness of 
the definition and balance between the mandatory and non-mandatory tools developed for 
the LZC homes agenda in England. Since their introduction by the Labour government in 
2006, the zero carbon target and the most widely used non-mandatory standard, the Code 
for Sustainable Homes, were criticised by experts for their strong emphasis on on-site LZC 
and other technologies, which, it was argued, often lacked cost effectiveness and did not 
necessarily lead to more sustainable outcomes24. Indeed, the policy agenda in general, 
including both building regulations and the Code, was criticised for focusing on the 
technological specification of design standards to the relative neglect of the challenges of 
how LZC homes perform in practice25. Standards, critics argued, should focus more strongly 
23 The widespread view that consumer drivers are weak is supported by primary evidence gathered 
by NHBC (2012). Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) had been introduced in 2004 with the aim 
of informing homebuyers about the energy efficiency of buildings. However, implementation 
weaknesses meant they had relatively little impact in fostering consumer drivers (Watts et al., 2011). 
The NHBC study found that “Just over half of all respondents are aware of the mandatory Energy 
Performance Certificate (EPC). However, of the consumers looking to move or those who had 
recently moved, only around one-third recall seeing an EPC, with the figure being less than a quarter 
of respondents in the rental market. Of all those looking to move, or those who had recently moved, 
just 12% say that the EPC influenced them” (NHBC, 2012).
24 These criticisms had been made in the early years of the Code (name, 2012). A survey by Baba et 
al found that a significant proportion of architects do not consider the Code to be an effective way of 
providing high quality homes and offering design solutions. 58.8 percent rated the CSH as “effective,” 
5.9 percent “very effective,” 32.4 percent ineffective and 2.9 percent very ineffective for achieving high 
quality new homes in the UK compared to 50 percent effective, 41.2 percent ineffective and 8.8 
percent very ineffective in providing design solutions (Baba et al., 2012). Prior studies cited above 
also refer to the technology focus of the Code e.g. Lowe and Oreszczyn (2008), Reid and Houston 
(2012).
25 These challenges were brought to prominence across industry by the work of the Zero Carbon Hub 
(Zero Carbon Hub, 2014, 2015).
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on ‘fabric first’ and consider the broad range of home occupant behaviours and practices 
that shape energy efficiency outcomes and demand26.
The deregulation agenda introduced in this context by the Conservative-led Coalition 
government from 2010, although expressly concerned with avoiding unforeseen negative 
consequences of regulation, is widely viewed as having, in some key respects, exacerbated 
the challenges for industry in delivering LZC homes. There is significant concern in housing 
and related sectors that the Coalition had not established a sufficiently strong, clear 
trajectory for national, mandatory regulations as a core driver of high performing LZC new 
homes.27 The Code had a key role in promoting innovation and driving down costs28. 
Important parts of building regulations, including on energy, were strengthened, catching up 
with the Code, hence creating some duplication and scope for ‘streamlining’ standards, a 
key, stated aim of the deregulation agenda. However, the proposed winding down of the 
Code raised concerns about some important sustainability criteria being lost from policy and 
the lack of a well-established, alternative non-mandatory standard that developers and local 
authorities might adopt to promote future innovation beyond the regulatory minimum. 
Deregulation was combined with a reduction in the support that many in industry felt they 
needed to promote research and skills development across the range of professions29 and 
local planning authorities involved in delivering LZC homes. 
26 The Local Housing Delivery Group (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012) provide a similar critique 
of other parts of the Code, commenting that “Although there may well be merit in providing facilities 
such as drying space, cycle storage and home office space in new homes, many considered it 
inappropriate for these to be encouraged through an energy/ CO2 requirement of the Code for 
Sustainable Homes”. Grant (2008) provided a similar, earlier critique of the water sections of the 
Code.
27 This finding mirrors that of Morgan et al (2015) and was evident in the 2013-14 Consultation on the 
zero carbon definition (DCLG, 2014).
28 This view, widely held amongst our interviewees, reflects prior detailed studies of costs which 
highlight significant falls since 2006 in costs, notably for photovoltaic panels and key elements of 
improving fabric energy performance (Zero Carbon Hub and Sweett group, 2014). This is reflected in 
significant falls in the cost of achieving Code levels 5 and 6 (in the region of 40-50%), compared with 
Part L (Element Energy, 2013).
29 Our interview findings highlight the importance of professional codes and training for surveyors and 
valuers, supporting the prior findings of Heffernan et al (2015).
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6. Conclusion and policy implications
Addressing the need for research evaluating policy mixes in the face of complex policy 
challenges, this study of the LZC homes agenda in England finds significant supportive 
evidence for a blend of mandatory and non-mandatory tools of the kind broadly advocated 
by ‘smart regulation.’ Yet, while the smart regulation approach reflects some welcome 
advancements upon traditional ‘command and control’ regulation, there is a danger of it 
ceding too much to the market liberal critique of state-led regulation. Although smart 
regulation does include a continued regulatory role for the state, our study suggests that this 
is under-stated, especially in the context of markets such as housing in England where 
consumer drivers towards higher environmental standards are weak. There is a much 
discussed need for government to more actively support industry in developing the tools and 
skills required in housing and related sectors. Smart regulation highlights the need and 
scope for public-private collaboration in defining regulations and standards. Yet the literature 
lacks detailed attention to the challenges of aligning the substantive definitions of mandatory 
and non-mandatory standards with the outcomes sought and the most appropriate scale of 
governance for different policies to be specified and adopted. In this study, the marked 
differences between the roadmaps to zero carbon offered by proposed changes to 
mandatory regulations and the Code as an industry-led non-mandatory tool, compounded by 
uncertainty about the future trajectory and role of these tools, meant that industry 
stakeholders widely felt that the required, clear regulatory trajectory towards LZC homes was 
lacking. The notion of ‘smartness’ needs to accommodate a continued role for state steering 
as a central feature of governance for promoting leading edge innovation, the delivery of and 
consumer engagement with the potential benefits of higher environmental standards. 
Appendix 1: Interviewee information
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